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DIVORCE--SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-REQUEST TO CHANGE PLEA
FOR RELIEF-EVIDENCE-ENTERING FINAL DECREE OVER
OBJECTION OF INNOCENT PARTY-No. 14274-Decided Octo-
ber 3, 1938-Doty vs. Dot y-Dstrct Court of Dener-Hon.
George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS: Wife brought suit for separate maintenance. Defend-
ant filed cross-complaint for divorce. During course of trial, plain-
tiff amended her plea to one for divorce and alimony and jury re-
turned a verdict in her favor. The Court entered Interlocutory De-
cree and awarded plaintiff th family home in satisfaction of all claims
for alimony. Plaintiff offered proof of her present circumstances to
support her plea for alimony, but the Court rejected the proffer. She
objected to the signing of the Interlocutory Decree, saying that she had
the right to again change her plea to the original one of separate main-
tenance. This objection was overruled and she moved to dismiss the
entire action, which motion also was denied. The final decree of
divorce was entered subsequently.
HELD: 1. Evidence leading to the awarding of equity in home
in satisfaction of all claims for alimony examined and found to sup-
port award.
2. The trial Court is vested with some discretion in matters of
the awarding of alimony and such discretion was not abused in the
instant case.
3. It was not error for the trial Court to refuse plaintiff's re-
quest to again change her cause of action to one for separate maintenance.
4. When emotional instability is the only ground urged in sup-
port of plaintiff's motion to again change her cause of action, it is not
sufficient reason for compelling trial Court to grant request.
5. While prior to 1933 a motion by the innocent party to dis-
miss the action for divorce might have been sustained although coming
after the Interlocutory Decree was entered, such is not the case today.
6. In 1933, the General Assembly declared that public policy
requires that the marital relation and the rights of parties to an action
for divorce shall be finally determined within a reasonable time after
trial, and that when the Interlocutory Decree is entered, the parties
shall be divorced six months after the date thereof, and the same shall
only be set aside for good cause shown after a hearing, and that such
decree shall be a final order as of the date of its entry.
7. The general rule seems to be that a divorce decree will not
set aside at the instance of the successful party.
8. Where it appears that the trial lasted four days, and the
Court was fully advised as to the respective economic status of the par-
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ties, the offer of proof as to plaintiff's needs at the time of the trial was
not improperly rejected, for further testimony on that score would
have been merely repetitions.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice
Young and Mr. Justice Holland, dissent.
POLICE POWER-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-MANDAMUS-Evi-
DENCE-No. 14276-Decided August 31, 1938-Maurer vs.
Boggs, Mayor, et al.-District Court of Logan County-Hon.
Arlington Taylor, Judge-Reversed-In Department.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought mandamus action to require City
council of Sterling to issue a license to retail 3.2% beer. The City
Council refused to issue license on ground that location of plaintiff's
business place was on the fringe of the city and out of the regular
business district and that made it too difficult to police the business
and neighborhood with the city's small police force. The trial court
refused the plaintiff relief.
HELD: 1. The action of a city council in refusing a permit to
a citizen, otherwise fully qualified to sell 3.2% beer does not rise to the
dignity of a policy of legal intendment to prohibit sale of such beer
in such neighborhood to all persons for it had not "ordained" in
statutory manner, and published to the world, that it elected to deny
such privilege under its police power. There was nothing to keep the
city from letting someone else have a license, or even letting the plain-
tiff have a license at a later date.
2. It was error fur trial court to admit in evidence protests sub-
mitted to City Council against other applicants for such licenses, and
an exhibit, containing uncomplimentary references to plaintiff where
its signers only asked for an investigation, should have been excluded.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Jus-
tice Bakke, and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-No. 14397-Decided September 19,
1938-Pryor Coal Mining Company et al. vs. Contino et al.-
District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed-
In Department.
HELD: "An injured workman is not to be denied a finding of
total and permanent disability because not the victim of 'helpless
paralysis reducing bodily functions 'to the minimum essential for the
maintenance of a mere spark of life'. And though 'able to obtain
occasional employment under rare conditions and at small remunera-
tion'; * * * one may still 'be totally disabled for all practical purposes
of competing for remunerative employment in any general field of
human endeavor.' "
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard, and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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CRIMINAL LAW - MURDER - ACCESSORY - EVIDENCE - INFOR-
MATION-INSTRUCTIONS-No. 14335-Decided September 19,
1938-Roberts vs. People-District Court, Weld County-Hon.
Claude C. Coffin" Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS: R. and W. were separately tried for murder of B. Each
was acquitted. After R's acquittal, but before W's acquittal, the dis-
trict attorney charged R. with being an accessory after the fact to B's
murder by W., but after W's acquittal amended the information charg-
ing the homicide to have been committed by a person or persons un-
known; and W. was likewise charged as an accessory. R. was tried
first and convicted. The case against W. was dismissed. R. assigns
error.
HELD: 1. There was no material variance between the charge
and the proof and the contention that R. was arraigned on one charge
and convicted on another is not sound since the amendment enlarged
the charge, making it broad enough to cover a murder by any person,
but not eliminating W. as the perpetrator.
2. "Inability to prepare against or even being misled so that
one does not prepare to defend against a specific charge is not prejudi-
cial if that charge is not relied upon and withdrawn from the jury."
3. Evidence of defendant when on trial for murder considered
and found to be sufficient, if believed by jury, to have sustained verdict
of "guilty" on accessory charge since it showed that defendant had
full knowledge that a crime had been committed and that he had
helped to conceal it.
4. In Colorado, the conviction of the principal is not a condi-
tion precedent to the conviction of an accessory, although this may
appear to be contrary to the common law.
5. The judgment in the principal felon's case, whether of con-
viction or acquittal, is not admissible for any purpose against the
accessory.
6. It was not error for court to have admitted testimony of W.
in presence of defendant R., that R. killed B., and that there was a
third party present, for the court properly instructed jury that it must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder was com-
mitted by some person "other than the defendant himself."
7. Exceptions going to the form of the information must be
made before trial.
8. There is no compelling reason for holding that the informa-
tion must state the means by which a concealment of a murder was
committed, particularly when that question is not raised until after
trial.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck dissent. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
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WILLS--CHARITABLE TRUSTS-INTERPRETATIONS OF CREATIVE
PROVISIONS-No. 14374-Decided October 3, 1938-In re:
Estate of Chucovich us. Jovanovich, etc.-County Court of Den-
ver-Hon. C. E. Kettering, Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS: Plans for a hospital building on the grounds of Denvei
General Hospital, ornamentation, memorial, lobby, etc., were examinec
by County Court and it found that it "is a monument of permanent
and ornamental nature * * * and within the terms of the will" which
appointed trustee to spend not to exceed $100,000.00 as a memoriai
to former Mayor Speer, and to "construct and establish an ornamental
fountain or gate or arch or other suitable monument of a permanent
and ornamental nature, on or at an entrance to the Civic Center, or
on or at an entrance to some other public park or public grounds in
the City * * *". The Attorney General of Colorado assigned error.
HELD: 1. Where a trust of charitable nature is created in
which the rights of heirs are not involved, such bequests are favored
by the Courts and, in the interpretation of the creative provisions, the
application of liberal rules may be indulged.
2. Where the doctrine of ejusdem generis is applied, it is gener-
ally used in connection with other important rules, not the least of
which is a determination of the intent. In .no event should the rule
be applied within narrower confines than such intention which is to
be gathered from the recognized meaning of the Wvords employed.
3. Where the testator clearly states his desire that the monument
be "a memorial in honor and memory of the late Mayor Robert W.
Speer," and gives the trustee instructions to construct same saying, "an
ornamental fountain or gate or arch or other suitable monument of a
permanent and ornamental nature," such a hospital fulfills the in-
structions.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Bakke not partici-
pating.
TAXATION - CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS - LABOR UNIONS - No.
14373-Decided October 3, 1938-Lane, et at. vs. Wilson,
etc.-District Court of Denver-Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge-
Afflirmed-En Banc.
HELD: 1. Real Estate owned by a labor union and used ex-
clusively in furtherance of its objects and purposes is not used for"strictly charitable purposes" within the meaning of Sec. 5 of Article
X of Colorado Constitution and therefore, is subject to taxation.
2. An organization which is a "beneficial society whose benefi-
cence is confined to the members, their families, depeandents or friends,
and depends upon the contributions made," not voluntarily given, but
assessed against the members, is "not a charity, but a private institu-
tion for the mutual advantage of the members."




ESTATES - ADMINISTRATOR - TRANSFER OF HEIR'S INTEREST -
COMPROMISES-No. 14240-Decided October 3, 1938-In re:
Estate of Smith us. Pueblo Savings and Trust Company-County
Court of Pueblo County-Hon. Hubert Glover, Judge-Afirmed
-In Department.
HELD: 1. The Court will not undertake to cancel a deed to
property in an estate from one heir to another in an action for ac-
counting brought by the grantor against the administrator (bank) of
the estate.
2. Nor will the title of the heir to said real estate be determined
in this kind of an action.
3. Assuming that the Warranty Deed to plaintiff's brother did
not cover the personal property, since he fails to show that he is en-
titled to it, he has no cause of action against the bank.
4. An heir may relinquish his rights by an express waiver or
release or by estoppel, and as between the parties, the renunciation
may be in any form which they adopt.
5. Compromises having for their object the settlement of family
difficulties or controversies are favored at law and in equity if at all
reasonable.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
RALPH CARR a distinguished member of the Colorado bar, isthe Republican nominee for governor of Colorado.
Ralph needs no introduction to the legal pro-
fession. tong an outstanding figure In Colrado,
he has made and unquestionably maintains a
splendid reputation for himself as a gentleman.
scholar and able attorney.
The Bar acknowledges him as a credit to the
profession.
Ralph was born 50 years ago In Rosita, down
near Westcliffe, Colorado. His father 'as a
hard rock miner and Ralph grew up and at-
tended the grade school and high school In
Cripple Creek. He worked as a reporter on the
Victor newspaper.
Upon graduating from high school Ralph went
on to the University of Colorado-still working on
newspapers to finance his education. Then in
1912. he received his LL.B. After practicing
law in Victor and Trinidad. be opened his law
office in Antonito. Colorado, in 1917. There he
served as County Attorney, member of the school
board and of the town council, performing his
duties conscientiously, skillfully and efficiently.
When In 1927 Colorado needed an authority on
water rights. Ralph Carr was selected. He went
to the state house as first assistant attorney
general. Two years later he was appointed U.
S. district attorney for Colorado. In his four
years in this federal office, he earned an enviable
reputation and won the respect and admiration
of both his fellow members of the bar and the
public. Keen, level-headed and Industrious and
unflinching he attained fame as one of the
finest federal officials in the country.
But the readers of Dicta know all this-
Perhaps some of us do not know, however.
that Ralph has been fighting a successful battle
for the State of Colorado and its water rights
for the past decade He played a leading part
in securing the rights saved for Colorado by the
Colorado River compact; and even at the present
time is actively assisting the Attorney General
of our State In protecting the water resources of
Colorado from attacks made by other States.
Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patronage
DRESS UP FOR FALL
Select your new Fall wardrobe of



















CORNER 16A AND STOUTel
Denver
Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patronage
MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENT AND HOSPITALIZATION






THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN AGENCY
708-10 Ry. Exchange Bldg. Ph. CH. 6521 Denver, Colorado
V. J. POBRISLO, General Agent
THE COLUMBIAN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
BOSTON, MASS.
"'A New England Institution"
